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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent theories of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing depart from the traditional 
asymmetric information models. Two recent IPO underpricing models are Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003). The Malaysian IPO market, 
characterised by high incidence of secondary offerings and IPO lockup commitments, 
provides a fertile ground to test the newer theories of IPO underpricing. Examining IPOs 
between August 1996 and June 2000 in Bursa Malaysia, the evidence lends support to 
the theoretical predictions that IPO underpricing is negatively related to owners' 
participation ratio and positively associated with the fraction of directors' shares which 
is subject to liquidity restrictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An impressive body of evidence around the world firmly establishes that initial 
public offerings (IPOs) are typically priced at substantial discounts from the 
values that prevail in the aftermarket. In other words, IPOs are on average 
underpriced where the initial market valuation significantly exceeds the IPO 
offer or subscription price. Ritter (2003) provides an excellent survey of the 
international empirical regularity of IPO positive initial returns in 38 countries 
ranging from an average of 5% for Denmark to 257% for China. This means that 
IPO investors around the globe on average earn positive initial return from 
purchasing shares at the IPO offer price and selling them at the closing price on 
the first day of trading. Ritter (1987) demonstrates that IPO underpricing, 
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whereby the share price jumps substantially on the first day of trading, represents 
a substantial cost of going public.  
 
Since the early 1980s, a considerable research effort has been devoted to 
understand the IPO underpricing phenomenon. A multitude of theoretical models 
has been constructed to offer explanations for the fact that newly listed 
companies and their selling shareholders would willingly sell the IPO shares at a 
price below the first day aftermarket price and bear the costs of not maximising 
the IPO proceeds and greater ownership dilution. Most of the earlier explanations 
on why IPOs are deliberately underpriced stem from the important informational 
asymmetries, i.e. an unequal distribution of information, between participants in 
the IPO market namely the owners/managers (insiders) of the company seeking a 
stock exchange listing, the investment banks who underwrite and market the 
IPO, and the outside investors.  
 
In the late 1990s, new explanations for IPO underpricing are advanced which 
depart from the traditional explanations of informational frictions that arise 
among IPO participants.  In these latest stories, information asymmetries are 
given less emphasis. Instead, IPO underpricing are associated with, among 
others, insiders' preference for wider outside ownership to enhance liquidity or 
entrench themselves (Booth & Chua, 1996; Brennan & Franks, 1997), insiders' 
wealth effects (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001; Loughran & Ritter, 2002) and the 
lockup commitment imposed on insiders (Mohan & Chen, 2001; Brav & 
Gompers, 2003). Lockup, or better known as share moratorium in Malaysia and 
lock-in in the United Kingdom (UK), means that the major shareholders of IPO 
companies commit themselves not to sell portions of their shareholdings during a 
lockup period immediately after the IPO. In Malaysia, lockups are imposed by 
the IPO regulator namely the Securities Commission on certain companies as a 
condition for listing on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange), whereas in the United States (US), lockup agreement is 
negotiated between the investment bank and the insiders of the IPO companies 
(Brau, Lambson & McQueen, 2005). Although the evidence on IPO underpricing 
largely bears out the predictions of the newer theories, it is still predominantly 
US-centric with the exception of Brennan and Franks (1997) who test UK data. 
 
Thus this study addresses the void in the IPO underpricing literature by testing 
the recent theories of IPO underpricing using Malaysian data. The Malaysian IPO 
market is well-suited for this task on two grounds. Firstly, secondary offering 
involving the sales of existing shares held by owners of IPO companies is a 
common feature of IPO in Malaysia, thus providing a unique opportunity to test 
owners' participation ratio on IPO underpricing. And secondly, given that IPO 
lockup is also prevalent in Malaysia, its effect on IPO underpricing can be 
examined outside the US.  
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The evidence shows that the more the owners participate in the IPO, the lower is 
the underpricing, consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) who assert that 
owners are more tolerant of underpricing the fewer shares they sell at the time of 
the IPO. The evidence also indicates that the greater the portion of directors' 
shares that are locked in, the higher is the underpricing. This is consistent with 
the notion that the severity of the IPO lockup imposed on the directors signals the 
ex-ante uncertainty facing the IPO company.  
 
This paper starts with a review of the literature on IPO underpricing with 
particular emphasis on the recent theories and evidence. Next, it describes the 
data and IPO underpricing model follows by the findings.  Lastly, it concludes 
and provides suggestions for future research.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Arguably the best known rationale for IPO underpricing is the adverse selection 
model proposed by Rock (1986). Rock's model assumed there is informational 
asymmetry among potential investors. Beatty and Ritter (1986), Balvers, 
McDonald, and Miller (1988), Carter and Manaster (1990), and James and Weir 
(1990) subsequently extended Rock's model. Among the empirically testable 
implications generated from the adverse selection models are underpricing should 
decrease as information becomes less heterogeneous across investor groups 
(Rock, 1986), the greater the ex-ante uncertainty the higher is the expected 
underpricing (Beatty & Ritter, 1986), high reputation investment bank will more 
frequently use high reputation auditor and both reputable investment bank and 
auditor help to reduce IPO underpricing (Balvers et al., 1988), more reputable 
investment banks are associated with less risky IPOs and underprice less in 
expectation (Carter & Manaster, 1990) and the presence of a borrowing 
relationship lessens the ex-ante uncertainty and the degree of underpricing (James 
& Weir, 1990; Schenone, 2004). Extensive empirical studies that test the adverse 
selection models of IPO underpricing generally find supportive evidence, the 
latest include Ang and Brau (2002) and Brau and Fawcett (2005). 
 
In contrast to the adverse selection models, signalling theory of IPO underpricing 
assumes informational asymmetries between the IPO companies and outside 
investors whereby certain amount of inside information such as potential future 
cash flows, investment opportunities and management expertise are known only 
to insiders. The three pioneering signalling models of IPO underpricing that have 
attracted the most attention are Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989) and Welch (1989). In all these models, underpricing is used as a signal 
that the company is of high quality whereby an IPO company that underpriced 
more is considered a better company. This echoes the view expressed in the 
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popular press that underpriced IPOs possess a certain aura of success.1 However, 
it seems inconsistent with the adverse selection model that argues high reputable 
underwriters are in favour of taking public high quality companies that are 
expected to exhibit lower underpricing. In addition, signalling models expect 
companies to raise additional funds in the future through seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). In signalling model, the SEO is an important mechanism by 
which high quality companies recoup the underpricing costs. Relative to the 
greater empirical success of the adverse selection models, support for the 
signalling models is mixed.  The absence of unanimity in prior work on the 
signalling model of IPO underpricing is perhaps due to the varying time interval 
between IPO and SEO. Arguably, the longer the interval, the more ambiguous the 
IPO underpricing signal becomes as there may be other confounding factors that 
come into play. Further, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that on theoretical ground 
it is unclear why throwing money away in the form of underpricing is a more 
efficient signal than advertising or philanthropy. However, a new study by Brau 
and Fawcett (2005) shows that from the CFO perspectives, IPO underpricing 
provides an external show of confidence and therefore is associated with a 
positive signal.  
 
Unlike the adverse selection models and the signalling models, the latest 
rationales for IPO underpricing do not assume that any parties has an information 
advantage. One strand of these studies focuses on the economic consequences of 
lockup provisions imposed on the pre-IPO shareholders. A lockup limits the 
freedom of the affected shareholders to sell their shares in the aftermarket for a 
specified period of time after the IPO. The conventional wisdom is that a lockup 
is a necessary evil to reduce the potential conflict between insiders and outside 
investors. By maintaining a significant economic interest in the company 
following the IPO, the insiders reassure potential IPO investors that they will not 
be taken advantage of which helps to mitigate the adverse selection problems 
faced by IPO investors.  
 
Based on the above motivation for lockups, Mohan and Chen (2001) and Brav 
and Gompers (2003) argue that the structure of the lockup agreements reflects the 
degree of the adverse selection/moral hazard problems and hence IPO 
underpricing. A shorter lockup is associated with less acute adverse selection 
problem and hence lower underpricing.  
 
Mohan and Chen (2001) test whether the lockup period has information content 
regarding ex-ante uncertainty about the IPO value. They argue that risky IPOs are 
associated with longer lockup period because investors need more time to resolve 
                                                     
1  Wall Street Journal regularly gives publicity to the so-called IPO winners, companies whose 
shares price had the largest percentage increase from offer price to aftermarket price.  
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the uncertainty. They analyse 729 IPOs from 1990 to 1992, of which 481 
companies have the standard 180 days, 73 companies have lockups less than 180 
days, and the remaining 175 companies have lockups more than 180 days. 
Regressing underpricing against lockup period in days and square of lockup 
period in days and other possible determinants of underpricing, they find a         
U-shaped relationship between underpricing and lockup period suggesting that 
lockup period that departs from the norm of 180 days is associated with more 
uncertainty about a company's value and deeper underpricing. 
 
Brav and Gompers (2003) examine 2,794 IPOs during 1988–1996 in the US and 
find that underpricing is higher for companies with a larger fraction of the shares 
outstanding subject to liquidity restrictions. They also show that opaque or less 
transparent companies, which are associated with greater informational 
asymmetries, have longer lockups. 
 
Another strand of new research relates IPO underpricing to the wealth of the IPO 
entrepreneurs. These recent wealth-based models of IPO underpricing, among 
others, seek to explain why dot-com IPOs left so much "money on the table"2 
through IPO underpricing compared to conventional IPOs. Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) wealth losses minimisation hypothesis posits that owners taking their 
companies public are not particularly concerned about IPO underpricing when 
their participation ratio in the IPO, measured by the ratio of secondary shares sold 
at the IPO to shares outstanding pre-IPO, is low. On the other hand, if they desire 
to cash out at the IPO stage, they have incentive to minimise the wealth transfer 
to potential IPO investors by reducing underpricing. Their model also predicts 
that IPO firms in which their owners plan to sell more shares at the IPO incur 
greater promotional costs, defined as fees paid to underwriter, auditors, lawyers 
and cost of road shows. Promoting the IPO serves to increase the fraction of 
uninformed investors taking part in the IPO, thereby helps to mitigate the adverse 
selection problems. Their tests on a sample of US IPOs during 1991 to 1995 lend 
empirical support to their predictions. The more owners' shares are offered in the 
IPO, the more companies are expected to spend in promoting the IPOs, and these 
promotional activities reduce underpricing. Similarly, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) document that the astronomical levels of underpricing during 1999 and 
2000, the so-called dot-com bubble, can be partly explained by the sharp decrease 
in both the frequency and magnitude of secondary sales of existing shares by all 
categories of pre-IPO owners, especially CEOs. 
 
                                                     
2  This is a practitioner jargon to ascribe the huge windfall gained or easy money earned by the 
preferred or lucky IPO investors who are allocated shares at the IPO, defined as the number of 
shares sold times the difference between first day closing price and offer price. 
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Recent studies on IPOs in Malaysia (Paudyal, Saadouni, & Briston, 1998; Yong, 
Yatim, & Sapian, 1999; Jelic, Saadouni, & Briston, 2001) relate to IPOs prior to 
1996, with the exception of Sun and Tong (2002) and Wan Hussin (2001, 2002, 
2003). As highlighted by Wan Hussin (2001, 2002, 2003), the IPO market in 
Malaysia has witnessed dramatic changes since 1996 in terms of pricing 
mechanism, the imposition of short-lived IPO profit guarantees on the major 
shareholders and significant drop in oversubscription rate and consequently 
underpricing.  
 
Paudyal et al. (1998) investigate the determinants of IPO underpricing in the 
Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia and document that the oversubscription rate or 
excess demand has an overwhelming influence.  Unlike Paudyal et al. (1998), 
Yong et al. (1999) examine underpricing of IPOs involving both the Main Board 
and Second Board companies during 1991–1995. They also investigate the 
impact of IPO types (primary issue, secondary offering or both) on underpricing 
and show that the level of IPO underpricing is not statistically different among 
IPO types.3  
 
Jelic et al. (2001) extend the sample period of Paudyal et al. (1998) study to 
include IPOs in the Main Board since 1980 and examine the role of underwriter 
reputation and earnings forecast in IPO prospectus on underpricing. They 
document that both underwriter reputation and the accuracy of earnings forecast 
do not influence IPO underpricing. However, market sentiment prior to IPO and 
oversubscription rate positively affect the level of underpricing. 
 
Unlike the other studies on IPOs in Malaysia, Wan Hussin (2002) does not 
examine underpricing per se but examines separately the determinants of IPO 
offer price and IPO first day closing price. He finds that the key determinants of 
IPO offer price and IPO aftermarket price are, respectively, the owners' 
participation ratio in the IPO and oversubscription rate. Given that IPO offer 
price and IPO aftermarket price are the two ingredients of IPO underpricing, this 
study attempts to develop a more accurate IPO underpricing model by 
simultaneously considering factors that influence IPO offer price and IPO first 
day market price. As mentioned earlier, it also addresses the void in the IPO 
underpricing literature by examining Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) rationale for 
IPO underpricing and the role of IPO lockup using non-US data. Furthermore, 
this study extends the literature on IPO underpricing in Malaysia by examining 
IPOs since 1996, which coincides with the IPO pricing liberalisation era.  
 
 
                                                     
3  In Malaysia, primary issue is known as public issue and secondary offering is called offer for 
sales. 
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DATA AND IPO UNDERPRICING MODEL 
 
Given that there are structural differences in IPO pricing following deregulation 
in 1996 with the removal of constraints on IPO price setting, the sample used to 
examine IPO underpricing is restricted to the post-liberalisation IPOs. The initial 
sample comprises of IPOs listed up to 30 June 2000 and whose determination of 
offer price are not subject to binding regulatory constraints. The cut off date for 
the sample ends at 30 June 2000 because in July 2000 new and enhanced 
prospectus disclosure requirements were introduced when the Securities 
Commission assumed the role as approving and registering authority for 
prospectuses from the then Registrar of Companies (now known as Companies 
Commission of Malaysia). Due to unavailability of a few prospectuses and 
removal of infrastructural project companies and a company engaged in 
investment banking, the sample is reduced to 157 companies. A further three 
companies are excluded because they lack complete data and the final sample is 
trimmed to 154 companies.   
 
Underpricing, or positive initial return, means that shares in an IPO are sold at a 
discount relative to their intrinsic or true value. Raw or unadjusted initial return 
(RETURN) is usually defined as the percentage change from the subscription 
price (IPO PRICE) to the closing price on the first day of trading (MKTPRICE) 
where: 
 
RETURN = (MKTPRICE – IPOPRICE)/IPOPRICE.  (1) 
 
Based on the evidence presented in Wan Hussin (2002), the variables associated 
with owners' participation ratio (OFFER) and oversubscription (DEMAND) 
which significantly affect IPO pricing and initial market valuation respectively 
are incorporated in the IPO initial return model. OFFER is the number of 
secondary shares offered in the IPO divided by pre-IPO shares and reflects the 
extent in which the owners participated in the IPO. In the spirit of Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001), OFFER is expected to reduce underpricing.  
 
The variable DEMAND measures the number of times IPO shares is over- or 
undersubscribed. If the evidence found in previous studies on Malaysian IPOs is 
any guide, DEMAND is expected to have a positive effect on underpricing. A 
large oversubscription rate reflecting strong investor interest in the IPO leads to 
increased heterogeneity of beliefs concerning the true value of the company. 
Reese (1998) shows that the level of investor interest, proxied by newspaper 
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citations leading up to the IPO, is positively related to initial return and IPO 
trading volume.4 
 
The effects of IPO lockup (LOCKUP) and IPO profit guarantee (GUARANTEE) 
on underpricing are also tested by incorporating the variables in the IPO initial 
return model. Studies in the US find that longer lockup signals greater ex-ante 
uncertainty about the company value. In Malaysia, the duration of the lockup 
among companies with IPO lockups is indistinguishable. Under the share 
moratorium rules that were in existence during the sample period, the major 
shareholders of all Second Board companies and certain Main Board companies 
involved in construction, property developments, services or specialised activities 
are not allowed to sell, transfer or assign 45% of the issued share capital of the 
companies within one year after listing. Thereafter, in every subsequent year, the 
major shareholders of the companies are permitted to dispose one third of the 
shares that are under moratorium. For this reason, the proportion of shares held 
directly and indirectly by directors which are locked in is used to signal the ex-
ante uncertainty.  
 
As elaborated in Wan Hussin and Ripain (2003), a unique feature of IPO market 
in Malaysia during 1996–1999 was the imposition of IPO profit guarantees on the 
major shareholders of certain IPO companies. With the profit guarantee 
agreement in place, IPO investors could take comfort that the forecasted/ 
projected profits of the IPO companies would be sustained for a 3-year period 
post listing. Like the signalling role of IPO lockup, the imposition of an investor 
protection mechanism in the form of profit guarantee by the IPO regulator 
signifies that the company has inherently high ex-ante uncertainty. Higher ex-
ante uncertainty is expected to exacerbate IPO initial return as investors require 
larger discount. Thus, both LOCKUP and GUARANTEE are expected to have a 
positive association with IPO underpricing.  
 
Since the dependent variable RETURN is expressed in percentage, the variables 
associated with IPO lockup and IPO profit guarantee are also expressed in 
percentages as follows where: 
 
Number of shares held directly or indirectly by directors 
which are locked in 
LOCKUP  = 
Number of post-IPO shares held directly or indirectly by 
directors 
(2) 
 
                                                     
4  For his sample of IPOs in the US, the demand schedule for the IPO shares is not directly 
observable. 
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Amount of guaranteed profits borne directly by 
directors or indirectly via persons or companies 
related to directors 
 
 
GUARANTEE   = 
Total guaranteed profits  
 
 
(3) 
 
In light of the evidence presented in Wan Hussin (2001) which clearly indicates 
that IPO underpricing is considerably less in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, a categorical variable associated with the economic condition (DECON) is 
also incorporated in the IPO initial return model. DECON takes a value of 1 for 
IPO listed after 1 September 1997.  And finally, a control variable SIZE, proxied 
by natural log of proforma net tangible assets, is included in the model. 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, the ordinary least squares regression to 
determine the factors affecting IPO initial return in Malaysia is: 
 
RETURNi   = a0 + a1OFFERi + a2DEMANDi + a3LOCKUPi + 
a4GUARANTEEi + a5 DECONi + a6 SIZE i + 
errori 
               (4)   
where 
 
 OFFER  =  number of secondary shares offered in the IPO divided   
   by pre-IPO shares,  
 DEMAND = number of times IPO shares is over- or undersubscribed, 
 DECON =  1 for IPO listed after 1 September 1997 and zero otherwise,  
 SIZE =  natural log of proforma net tangible assets post-IPO, 
 
and RETURN, LOCKUP and GUARANTEE are as previously defined in 
equations (1), (2) and (3). Data are obtained from the IPO prospectuses, Investors 
Digests and Reuters Business Briefings.  
                       
 
FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 shows the sample characteristics, partitioned by pre- and post-crisis and 
board of exchange (Main or Second Board). Out of 154 companies in the sample, 
67 companies are listed prior to the Asian Financial Crisis on 1 September 1997, 
and 87 companies after the crisis. Slightly over 70% of the sample companies are 
listed on the Second Board. Panel A shows that nearly 60% of the sample 
companies are audited by the then Big-5 firms of accountants comprising Arthur 
Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick  and Price 
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Waterhouse5. The incidence of using large firms of accountants is slightly higher 
for Main Board companies than Second Board, particularly after the crisis. 
Slightly over 35% of the sample companies engaged either Arab Malaysian 
Merchant Bankers (AMMB) or Commerce International Merchant Bankers 
(CIMB) as the managing underwriters. These two firms are designated as 
"prestigious" underwriters in this study based on their IPO market share.6 
 
TABLE 1 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis  
Main 
(n = 19) 
Second 
(n = 48) 
Main 
(n = 22) 
Second 
(n = 65) 
Total 
(n = 154) 
Panel A: Financial Advisers Engaged 
Both auditor and underwriter 
"prestigious" 
Only auditor is "prestigious" 
Only underwriter is "prestigious" 
None are "prestigious" 
 
 
 
4 
7 
1 
7 
 
 
 
11 
15 
9 
13 
 
 
 
9 
7 
1 
5 
 
 
 
11 
25 
10 
19 
 
 
 
35 
54 
21 
44 
Panel B: Investor Protection 
Profit Guarantee 
Lockup 
None 
 
0 
1 
18 
 
35 
13 
0 
 
1 
6 
15 
 
45 
20 
0 
 
81 
40 
33 
Panel C: IPO Underpricing 
Positive Initial Return 
Negative Initial Return 
 
19 
0 
 
48 
0 
 
15 
7 
 
50 
15 
 
132 
22 
Panel D: Demand for IPO shares 
Oversubscribed 
Undersubscribed 
 
19 
0 
 
48 
0 
 
17 
5 
 
54 
11 
 
138 
16 
Panel E: Sector 
Construction 
Consumer product 
Industrial product 
Trading and services 
Others (finance, plantation, property) 
 
1 
0 
6 
5 
7 
 
9 
9 
22 
8 
0 
 
1 
1 
10 
5 
5 
 
9 
20 
28 
8 
0 
 
20 
30 
66 
26 
12 
 
Pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples consist of companies that were listed before and after 1 September 1997, 
respectively. "Prestigious" auditors are the so-called Big-5, namely Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG Peat Marwick and Price Waterhouse. "Prestigious" underwriters are Arab Malaysian 
Merchant Bankers (AMMB) or Commerce International Merchant Bankers (CIMB). (Note: Price Waterhouse is 
now known as PricewaterhouseCoopers following the merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & 
Lybrand). 
 
                                                     
5   Price Waterhouse is now known as PricewaterhouseCoopers following the merger between Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand. 
6  In an article published by Asiamoney (November 1999) titled "Humbling of Daim Zainuddin" by 
Matthew Montagu-Pollock, the author states: "CIMB is considered to be Malaysia's number one 
or number two merchant bank, alongside Arab-Malaysian." 
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Panel B shows that IPO profit guarantees are commonplace among companies 
listed on the Second Board. Only eight out of 41 companies listed on the Main 
Board (or 20%) are imposed with IPO profit guarantees or shares lockup, 
whereas all Second Board companies have either one of the investor protection 
mechanisms in place.  
 
Panels C and D show that prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, all IPOs are 
underpriced and oversubscribed. However after the crisis, more than 10% of 
IPOs are undersubscribed and their first day closing price is lower than the IPO 
offer price (negative initial return). Panel E indicates that most of the IPOs in the 
sample are involved in construction, consumer products, industrial products and 
trading and services. None of the companies seeking listing in the Second Board 
are involved in financial services, plantation and property. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables used in the 
IPO initial return study, partitioned by pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples. It is 
evidently clear from Table 2 that average initial return and average 
oversubscription rate plunged in the aftermath of the crisis, from 154% and 60 
times to 28% and 19 times, respectively. The average underpricing and average 
oversubcription rate for the full sample are 83% and 37 times, respectively. Prior 
to the Asian financial crisis there are three IPOs in the sample that record the 
maximum allowable first day return of 400%.7 There do not appear to be other 
important differences between pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples other than 
along the two dimensions mentioned above.    
 
Table 3 provides further information on IPO underpricing for the sample 
companies, partitioned by pre-crisis and post-crisis periods and board of 
exchange. Second Board companies enjoy higher average IPO underpricing than 
Main Board companies particularly before the crisis. Overall, companies that 
engaged both "prestigious" auditors and underwriters for the IPOs record the 
highest average IPO underpricing. Companies with investor protection 
mechanisms either in the form of shares lockup or profit guarantees also register 
higher average underpricing than those without. As expected, Panel C shows that 
oversubscribed IPOs yield higher average underpricing than undersubcribed 
IPOs. Prior to the crisis, IPOs from the construction sector have the highest 
average underpricing. However, after the crisis, the highest average underpricing 
is earned by IPOs from the consumer product sector. 
 
 
                                                     
7  Although not stated in the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, there was an unwritten limit up 
ruling that capped the premium on IPO at five times the offer price (see Business Times Malaysia 
dated 24 September 1996 – IPOs continue to post fat premiums). 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE FIRMS  
 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Pre-crisis     
RETURN (n = 67) 1.54 1.48 0.96 0.03 4.00 
OFFER (n = 67) 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.42 
DEMAND (n = 67) 60.41 51.56 43.97 4.47 200.25 
LOCKUP (n = 14)* 0.88 1.00 0.22 0.35 1.00 
GUARANTEE (n = 35)** 0.92 1.00 0.21 0.20 1.00 
NET ASSETS (RMmillion)  
(n = 67) 
126.21 57.22 199.67 31.00 1251.00 
Post-crisis     
RETURN(n = 87) 0.28 0.14 0.48 –0.54 1.94 
OFFER (n = 87) 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.45 
DEMAND (n = 87) 18.51 6.77 25.91 –0.79 161.67 
LOCKUP (n = 26)* 0.74 0.87 0.31 0.00 1.00 
GUARANTEE (n = 46)** 0.96 1.00 0.13 0.19 1.00 
NET ASSETS (RMmillion)   
(n = 87) 
114.23 60.05 245.46 28.00 2044.00 
All     
RETURN (n = 154) 0.83 0.56 0.96 –0.54 4.00 
OFFER (n = 154) 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.45 
DEMAND (n = 154) 36.74 31.62 40.57 –0.79 200.25 
LOCKUP (n = 154) 0.20 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
GUARANTEE (n = 154) 0.50 0.55 0.49 0.00 1.00 
NET ASSETS (RMmillion)   
(n = 154) 
119.44 59.28 226.05 28.00 2044.00 
 
Pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples consist of companies that were listed before and after 1 September 1997, 
respectively. RETURN = (First day market price – IPO offer price)/IPO offer price, OFFER = Number of 
secondary shares offered in the IPO divided by pre-IPO shares, DEMAND = Number of times IPO shares is 
over- or under-subscribed, LOCKUP = Number of shares held directly or indirectly by directors which are 
locked in/Number of post-IPO shares held directly or indirectly by directors, GUARANTEE = Amount of 
guaranteed profits borne directly by directors or indirectly via persons or companies related to directors/Total 
guaranteed profits, and NET ASSETS = Net tangible assets immediately post-IPO.  
* only companies with lockup 
** only companies with profit guarantee. 
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TABLE 3 
AVERAGE IPO UNDERPRICING STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE FIRMS 
 
Pre-crisis Post-crisis  
Main 
(n = 19) 
Second 
(n = 48) 
Main 
(n = 22) 
Second 
(n = 65) 
Total 
(n = 154) 
 0.74 1.86 0.25 0.28 0.83 
Panel A: Financial Advisers 
Engaged 
Both auditor and underwriter 
"prestigious" 
Only auditor is "prestigious" 
Only underwriter is "prestigious" 
None are "prestigious" 
 
 
0.64 
 
0.74 
0.49 
 
0.84 
 
 
2.20 
 
1.89 
1.82 
 
1.56 
 
 
0.31 
 
0.24 
–0.30 
 
0.27 
 
 
0.40 
 
0.29 
0.18 
 
0.26 
 
 
0.97 
 
0.79 
0.87 
 
0.74 
Panel B: Investor Protection 
Profit guarantee 
Lockup 
None 
 
NA 
2.08 
0.67 
 
1.83 
1.94 
NA 
 
–0.18 
0.63 
0.13 
 
0.12 
0.65 
NA 
 
0.86 
1.13 
0.41 
Panel C: Demand for IPO shares 
Oversubscribed 
Undersubscribed 
 
 
0.74 
NA 
 
 
1.86 
NA 
 
 
0.33 
–0.02 
 
 
0.33 
0.04 
 
 
0.92 
0.02 
Panel D: Sector 
Construction 
Consumer product 
Industrial product 
Trading and services 
Others (finance, plantation, 
property) 
 
2.08 
NA 
0.97 
0.74 
0.36 
 
2.32 
1.94 
1.65 
1.82 
    NA 
 
0.17 
1.26 
0.07 
0.20 
0.47 
 
–0.02 
0.42 
0.25 
0.41 
NA 
 
1.15 
0.90 
0.76 
0.87 
0.41 
 
Pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples consist of companies that were listed before and after 1 September 1997, 
respectively. "Prestigious" auditors are Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat 
Marwick and Price Waterhouse. "Prestigious" underwriters are Arab Malaysian Merchant Bankers (AMMB) or 
Commerce International Merchant Bankers (CIMB).  
NA = not applicable. (Note: Price Waterhouse is now known as PricewaterhouseCoopers following the merger 
between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand). 
 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix for the continuous variables used in the IPO 
underpricing model is presented in Table 4. Although some of the independent 
variables are correlated but none of the coefficients are greater than 0.6. As 
reported below under the regression result, none of the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for the explanatory variables are greater than four, which indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a cause for concern in the IPO underpricing model. 
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TABLE 4 
PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX FOR CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
 
 RETURN OFFER DEMAND LOCKUP GUARANTEE 
OFFER –0.222**     
DEMAND 0.679** –0.132    
LOCKUP 0.209** –0.145 0.160*   
GUARANTEE 0.026 0.101 0.078 –0.557**  
SIZE –0.215** –0.116 –0.293** –0.077 –0.531** 
 
RETURN = (First day market price – IPO offer price/IPO offer price. OFFER = Number of secondary shares 
offered in the IPO divided by pre-IPO shares.  DEMAND = Number of times IPO shares is over- or 
undersubscribed. LOCKUP = Numbers of shares held directly by directors which are locked in/Numbers of 
post-IPO shares hedl directly or indirectly by directors. GUARANTEE = Amount of guaranteed profits borne 
directly by directors or indirectly via persons or companies related to directors/Total guaranteed profits. SIZE = 
Natural log of net tangible assets immediately post-IPO. 
* indicates significant at 5% (2-tailed) 
** indicates significant at 1%(2-tailed)  
  
The regression results are reported in Table 5. The impressive adjusted R2 
indicates that the model can explain almost two-third of the cross sectional 
variation in IPO underpricing in Malaysia during the study period. This figure is 
almost double the adjusted R2 obtained by Paudyal et al. (1998) who examine 79 
IPOs on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia during 1984–1995.  
 
Consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), the more the owners participate in 
the IPO by offering secondary shares (OFFER) the lower is the expected 
underpricing as owners have incentive to price the IPO more fully to minimise 
their wealth losses from unnecessary underpricing.  The positive association 
between oversubscription ratio (DEMAND) and underpricing reinforces prior 
evidence by Yong (1997) and Paudyal et al. (1998). A likely explanation, 
importing from Reese (1998), is that huge investor enthusiasm in the IPO as 
reflected by the extent in which demand overwhelms supply generates divergence 
of beliefs concerning the true value of the company which results in a higher 
initial return.   
 
Both LOCKUP and GUARANTEE have positive coefficients, although only 
LOCKUP is statistically significant. This suggests that consistent with the 
evidence on IPO lockup in the US, the larger the portion of directors' shares that 
are locked in, the higher is the ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing. When the 
regression is re-run using dummy variables to indicate whether or not IPO lockup 
exists (DLOCKUP) or whether or not IPO profit guarantee exists 
(DGUARANTEE), in place of GUARANTEE and LOCKUP, the results are 
qualitatively similar. The positive coefficients on the variables associated with 
lockup and profit guarantee indicate that investors view companies that are 
imposed with such conditions by the regulators as particularly risky, and thus 
demand a higher discount for purchasing these shares. 
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TABLE 5 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR IPO UNDERPRICING MODEL 
 
  Coefficient Coefficient 
INTERCEPT 1.512** 1.363* 
OFFER –1.240** –1.260** 
DEMAND 0.008** 0.008** 
LOCKUP 0.511**  
GUARANTEE 0.174  
DECON –0.943** –0.966** 
(Financial crisis = 1)   
SIZE = Natural log of 
net tangible assets 
post-IPO 
 
 
–0.118 
 
 
–0.093 
DLOCKUP 
(Lockup = 1) 
  
0.494** 
DGUARANTEE 
(Profit guarantee = 1) 
  
0.239 
Observations 154 154 
VIF range 1.075 to 2.830 1.069 to 3.805 
Adjusted R2 0.633 0.633 
 
In the above model, the dependent variable is RETURN, defined as (First day market 
price – IPO offer price)/IPO offer price. The independent variables are OFFER = Number 
of secondary shares offered in the IPO divided by pre-IPO shares, DEMAND = Number 
of times IPO shares is over- or under-subscribed, LOCKUP = Number of shares held 
directly or indirectly by directors which are locked in/Number of post-IPO shares held 
directly or indirectly by directors, GUARANTEE = Amount of guaranteed profits borne 
directly by directors or indirectly via persons or companies related to directors/Total 
guaranteed profits, DECON takes a value of one for companies that were listed after           
1 September 1997 and zero otherwise, SIZE = Natural log of net tangible assets post-IPO, 
DLOCKUP and DGUARANTEE are dummy variables that take the value of one if 
lockup or profit guarantees were impose respectively and zero otherwise.  
* indicates significant at 5%  
** indicates significant at 1% 
 
Consistent with the univariate analysis in Table 3, the coefficient for DECON is 
negative reflecting lower underpricing for the post-crisis period. In common with 
previous studies, this study also found that larger companies have lower 
underpricing as reflected by the negative coefficient for SIZE, albeit insignificant 
at the conventional level. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study tests whether owners' participation and share lockups influence IPO 
underpricing in Malaysia after the pricing liberalisation in 1996 and prior to the 
introduction of enhanced disclosure requirements for IPO prospectus in July 
2000. The study enriches the IPO underpricing literature by testing Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003) rationales for IPO underpricing 
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using data outside the US. The evidence using Malaysian data shows that both 
variables significantly influence IPO underpricing in the predicted directions. 
Furthermore, unlike previous studies, the IPO underpricing model used in this 
study simultaneously incorporates factors that influence both IPO offer price and 
IPO first day market price, which are the two ingredients of IPO underpricing. 
This methodology yields an IPO underpricing model with a significantly 
improved explanatory power. 
 
This study can be extended in the future by adjusting the raw underpricing for 
market movements between prospectus date and first day trading date and  
incorporating specific uses of the IPO proceeds and the identity of shareholders 
whose shares are subject to liquidity constraints in the IPO underpricing model. It 
is also instructive to consider the effects of owners' participation and lockups on 
the long run IPO share price performance. 
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